4-4-2 : Pros and Cons

19 April, 2016

One of the most, if not the most common formation in football, the 4-4-2 is surely no stranger to world football. With a popular football magazine named after it, this system is most popular in England. At the same time, this system is also used by the NFDP, with all training centres under the governance of the NFDP training using this formation. In this article, we take a look at some the pros and cons of this fabled system.

As with all other formations, the 4-4-2 is composed of 10 players (note: the goalkeeper is never mentioned in formations), with 4 defenders, 4 midfielders, and 2 forwards. There is no hard fast rule on positioning – a general way to see it is 2 centre backs, a left back and a right back in defence; 2 central midfielders, a left midfielder and right midfielder in the midfield; and 2 centre forwards in offence. The NFDP, however, uses one with a ‘midfield diamond’, i.e. 4 defenders, 4 midfielders and 2 forwards, but instead of a ‘flat four’, the midfield is arranged in a diamond shape, with a defensive midfielder, 2 side midfielders and an attacking midfielder forming the 4 points of the diamond, essentially giving the team a 4-3-1-2 shape.

Here’s an excerpt from the National Football Development Plan (available at www.planetbola.my, the NFDP’s website): “The NFDP will adopt a 4-4-2 training formation with a ‘diamond-shaped midfield’ and quickly revert to 4-5-1 when defending. This 4-4-2 system is chosen to unearth as many attacking talents through the NFDP. The application of this system is only for training purpose during the talent development stage of players aged 12 to 17-years and is not focused on tactics. Furthermore, the 4-4-2 system is easy to apply and suitable to be instilled into young talents.” The system implemented by the NFDP is definitely about playing attacking football, and in such a formation, the midfield diamond means a large majority of the teams’ attacking play will come from the centre, rather than from the wings as one might expect of a 4-3-3. Generally in a 4-4-2, the left and right back will move forward when the team has the ball, so as to provide some support to the attack on the wings. Also, one of the 2 forwards will usually drop deeper to collect passes from the midfield, acting as a bridge between the midfield and attack. Said striker is often a ‘target man’ – so named because he is the target for passes forward. He is normally big, strong and able to retain possession well while waiting for other teammates to move into more dangerous positions, thread a defence-splitting pass to the other forward lying in wait, or simply knock the ball down in the box for another teammate to score.


In attack, one of the things a 4-4-2 also allows for is swarming and restricting the opposition to their half of the pitch. A high defensive line, along with the midfield pushing high up the pitch can confine an opponent in their own half effectively by making sure the ball doesn’t get out of it. This makes for sustained attacks should possession be conceded – lose the ball and it is immediately possible to go after it. A team playing with such a formation and moves as one coherent unit will definitely excel. Such a team would be able to commit numbers to both attack and defence. By deploying many players to swarm the opponent’s box, there are, of course, more goalscoring opportunities. Should possession be lost, the ball back can quickly be won back high in the opponent’s half, giving them no time to organise themselves and launch a counter-attack.

The weaknesses of a 4-4-2 are generally the same across all its’ variations, however a 4-4-2 with a midfield diamond is especially prone to being hit on the wings upon losing the ball, and surely it is for this reason that NFDP teams revert to the 4-5-1 in defence. With the 2 side midfielders in the diamond positioned halfway between the wing and the centre, there are only the left and right backs left to defend the wide positions, hence there is plenty of space on both wings for the opponent to exploit, especially with them having to track all the way back down the length of the pitch when the ball is lost. Should the 2 side midfielders in the diamond move out wide, spaces would open up in the centre of the park for opponents to exploit (which they will, no doubt). In a ‘flat four’, defending with 3 lines of players as compared to, say, a 4-3-2-1, means the opponent can find spaces ‘between the lines’ to attack and this is especially dangerous in the space between the midfield and defensive lines. This is another reason why compactness is so important in a 4-4-2 – to close off the spaces and block off the opponent’s options. A team that leaves huge spaces between the lines is essentially asking to be hit hard on the break. In defence, the team must move as one, shifting toward where the ball is and closing down the spaces there, and this also requires hardworking and alert players who understand and know exactly what to do. Intelligent man-marking along with correct positioning, are absolutely critical here.


Defensively, one of the best users (arguably) of the 4-4-2 is the current coach of Atlético Madrid, Diego Simeone. So far in the 2015-2016 season, his side have only conceded 14 league goals, putting them in 2nd best among Europe’s top 5 leagues. However, Atleti have played 30 games, compared to Bayern Munich in top spot, who have conceded 13 in 27 games. This means Atleti’s concede approximately 0.47 goals per league game, whereas Bayern concede about 0.48. Atleti’s defence concedes so few goals that if you were to divide games per goal conceded it amounts to a staggering 2.5 matches per goal conceded. This strength in defence is down to compactness and precise man-marking to cut off the opponent’s passing options, along with hardworking, disciplined and alert players. They press and win the ball in the right areas of the pitch, and in defence, by keeping the centre compact, the opponents are forced out wide, which is exactly what Simeone’s men want. Using the sidelines as an 180° barrier, it is there that his team usually win the ball. Atlético clearly cannot much up to the firepower of Barcelona or Real Madrid’s frontline, but a defence so solid can definitely stifle even the fiercest attack.

There is no perfect formation that can guarantee success all the time – sticking to a winning formation stubbornly will eventually come back to bite one when an opponent is able to exploit the team’s weaknesses. Every formation has its’ strengths just as it has weaknesses. One can only decide on a formation that works to the team’s strengths, and even then it doesn’t always work out, especially when other factors such as financial capability come into play. We can only conclude with absolute certainty that there is no such thing as a guarantee of success when it comes to deciding on a formation.

Source - An analysis written by Beng Jin, Planet Bola